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Hostile takeover often occurs, after China‟s capital market went into the full 
circulation era. According to the Agency Theory, the Control Power Theory and the 
Disciplinary Theory, hostile takeover is one of effective external corporate 
governance and supervision system. It can supervise and promote companies whose 
management efficiency and operating performance are poor to improve skills of 
operation and management. However, according to the Stakeholder Theory and the 
Wealth Transfer Theory, shareholders get takeover premium, which are transferred 
from creditors, employees, customers, managers or other stakeholders. Therefore, 
hostile takeover will damage legitimate benefit of other stakeholders. 
In July 2015, Shenzhen BaoNeng Investment Group Co. Ltd purchased Vanke 
stake to 5% of Vanke total equity, which triggered the competition for the control 
power of Vanke between the founder team of Vanke and BaoNeng Group (referred to 
as “BaoNeng and Vanke Event”). In China‟s capital market, “BaoNeng and Vanke 
Event” led many listed companies to amend articles of association. They added 
anti-takeover clauses to articles of association. 
This paper collects and classifies anti-takeover clauses in articles of association 
of A-share listed companies of China‟s capital market. The time range is from the 
Tenth, July,2015 to the Seventh, March, 2017. What‟s more, this paper makes 
descriptive statistics for per kind of anti-takeover clauses and find that the most 
clauses which listed companies added to the articles of association are the terms of 
secondary offering. And the second more clauses are the terms about the procedure of 
board of directors and stockholders‟ meeting, such as terms of restricting rights of 
nominating directors and changing the amount of directors and super-majority terms. 
Furthermore, this paper qualitatively analyze content, operating principle and effect of 
anti-takeover clauses. In accordance with categories of anti-takeover clauses, this 
paper chooses 1-2 listed companies to illustrate anti-takeover clauses in articles of 
association and analyze why many listed companies added anti-takeover clauses to 















Finally, on the basis of retrospect and analysis of “BaoNeng and Vanke Event”, 
using the experience of other countries for reference and combining with the actual 
situation of our country and listed companies of China, this paper puts forward 
suggestions to improve China‟s corporate governance and operating efficiency of 
China‟s capital market by descriptive statistics and the qualitative analysis of 
anti-takeover clauses in the articles of association. 
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国资本市场上上市公司收购的数量逐渐增加。表 1-1 是 2006 年至 2016 年我国资
本市场上收购数量和收购金额的具体情况表，图 1-1 是 2006 年至 2016 年我国资
本市场上收购数量折线图，如图 1-1 所示，在股权分置改革的初期阶段（2006
年至 2012 年），我国资本市场上收购数量变化不大；2012 年以后，由于股权分
置改革初见成效，我国资本市场上收购数量急剧增加；2015 年，我国基本完成
股权分置改革，我国资本市场进入全流通时代，收购数量也在 2015 年达到顶峰，
有 6,534 起。 
 
 




















表 1-1  我国 2006 年-2016 年收购数量和金额表 
时间（年） 数量（起） 金额（亿元） 
2006 1,418 16,082.40 
2007 2,478 107,757.62 
2008 2,423 96,564.03 
2009 2,044 65,064.58 
2010 2,883 66,916.55 
2011 3,471 66,921.97 
2012 1,904 18,996.98 
2013 2,464 15,592.40 
2014 4,113 25,995.15 
2015 6,534 30,422.92 
2016 4,505 30,534.20 
合计 34,237 540,848.81 
数据来源：wind 数据库 
 























































































的修改，即在公司章程中增加反收购条款（“宝万事件”后，即 2015 年 7 月 10
日至 2017 年 3 月 7 日）。然后，本文收集、分类整理和描述性统计 2015 年 7 月






























公司章程中反收购条款的修改。此外，收集和分类整理 2015 年 7 月 10 日至 2017
年 3 月 7 日之间（“宝万事件”发生之后）我国资本市场上 A 股上市公司在公司
章程中设置的反收购条款，并对其进行描述性统计分析。 













法，收集和分类整理了 2015 年 7 月 10 日至 2017 年 3 月 7 日之间我国 A 股上市
公司在公司章程中设置的反收购条款，并对其进行了描述性统计分析。此外，本






















条款的定性研究。本文的创新之处在于，首次收集了 2015 年 7 月 10 至 2017 年








本文的另一个创新之处是首次分类整理并分析了 2015 年 7 月 10 至 2017 年
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